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International Courts and Tribunals as 
Fact-Finders:  The Case of Scientific Fact-
Finding in International Adjudication 
MAKANE MOÏSE MBENGUE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  FINDING . . . THE “UNCERTAIN FACT” 
Fact-finding is both intrinsic and extrinsic to any international 
adjudication process.1 It is intrinsic to the adjudicatory process since the 
very leitmotiv of the international judicial function is to make findings 
of law in light of the particular facts of a dispute. Without facts, law as 
“clarified”2 or “developed”3 by international courts and tribunals would 
be a mere abstraction. Law, and more especially international law, is not 
“so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgments in 
confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in 
 
* Lecturer, University of Geneva, Faculty of Law (Department of Public International Law and 
International Organization) and Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 
(Geneva). The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor José Alvarez, Professor 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, and His Excellency Judge Bruno Simma for their insightful 
comments and remarks. The author would also like to express his deep gratitude to Katherine Del 
Mar, Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate Institute (Geneva) and Visiting Scholar at the Lauterpacht 
Centre for International Law for her insightful comments and her invaluable help in editing the 
present contribution. 
 1. See Christine Chinkin, U.N. Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Missions:  Lessons 
from Gaza, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:  ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN 477 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert D. Sloane & 
Siegfried Wiessner eds., 2011) (“Fact-finding has often been perceived and engaged in as 
complementary to dispute resolution processes.”). 
 2. On the idea of international courts and tribunals acting as “law-clarifiers” and not as 
“law-makers,” see, for example, Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the 
Imports of Wool Shirts and Blouses From India, 19, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997). See also 
South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 465, 540 (Dec. 
21) (joint dissenting opinion of Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice) (“It is not for a 
Judge today, in the light of the greater knowledge granted him by the passage of time, to do more 
than apply the law as it is, in the light of the facts as they stood when the situation he is dealing 
with arose.”). 
 3. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT xiii (1958). 
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real cases in the real world.”4 Fact-finding is furthermore extrinsic to 
any adjudicatory process for the administration of international justice 
and is primarily contingent upon an appreciation, determination, and 
qualification of the facts that surround a legal dispute. Without a proper 
systematization of facts, international courts and tribunals would 
operate in a vacuum and their decisions would address facts that are 
either moot or disconnected from a legal dispute, to say the least. 
Dealing efficiently with “the complexities involved in the serious and 
rigorous sifting of evidence”5 requires sound fact-finding. Indeed, if the 
“law lies within the judicial knowledge of”6 the “International Judge”7 
(jura novit curia), facts lie at the periphery of judicial control and 
demand to be rationalized through the adjudicatory process.8 
The “elucidation of facts”9—which is referred to today as “fact-
finding”—thus appears as a “Gentle Civilizer”10 of international courts 
and tribunals. Fact-finding has become so intertwined with the 
international judicial function that the judicial notice of facts is 
incontestably part of the “common law of international adjudication.”11 
 
 4. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 31, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
 5. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
18 (1991). 
 6. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1973 I.C.J. 49, ¶ 18 (Feb. 2) (jurisdiction 
of the court) [hereinafter Germany Fisheries Jurisdiction of the Court]. 
 7. DENNIS TERRIS, CESARE P. ROMANO, LEIGH SWIGART & SONIA SOTOMAYOR, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JUDGE:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE 
WORLD’S CASES xi–xii (2007). 
 8. See C. E. FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS:  EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDENS OF PROOF AND FINALITY 5 (2011). The 
author explains that 
[t]he notion that it is a court or tribunal’s task to apply the law to the facts forms part of 
what has been characterized in the West as the “rationalist” tradition . . . . In the 
rationalist conception, fact and law are approached as distinct and separate. Rules 
governing evidence and procedure serve to help bring about “rectitude of decision” 
through the “correct application of valid law to true facts” . . . . The expectation of 
being able to determine the facts is the guiding principle. 
Id. See also MICHELLE T. GRANDO, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND FACT-FINDING IN WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 5 (2009) (“the process of fact-finding is the process through which a panel 
formulates its conclusions with respect to the facts of a case, that is, it is the process through 
which the facts of a case are established. In this regard, it is important to note that panels consider 
and establish facts against the background of a legal provision . . .”).  
 9. Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 9, July 29, 1899, 32 
Stat. 1779. 
 10. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS:  THE RISE 
AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2004). 
 11. CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 90–118 (2007) 
(laying the groundwork for the common law of international adjudication). 
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Nevertheless, the “process of fact-finding”12 is not linear. It is rather a 
circular process where international courts and tribunals always find 
themselves contemplating new types of facts. The nature of those facts 
varies substantively, and with it the nature of the process of fact-finding. 
One of the categories of facts that is of utmost importance in 
international adjudication and which shakes the foundations of fact-
finding processes is the category of scientific facts. Scientific facts 
cover the broad array of facts pertaining to “the structure and behavior 
of the physical and natural world.”13 The present contribution focuses on 
the specific question of what may be called “scientific fact-finding” 
before international courts and tribunals.   
At the outset, one may query if there is such a thing as “scientific 
fact-finding” by international courts and tribunals. International 
adjudicators are not scientists,14 and scientists, regardless of their 
potential contribution to the international dispute-settlement processes, 
are clearly not organs “of law”15 capable of, nor requested, to settle a 
dispute “by the application of principles and rules of international 
law.”16 As international courts and tribunals are mainly “composed of 
legal experts or arbitral practitioners,”17 there is arguably a priori 
“inherent limitations on the exercise of [their] judicial function”18 when 
they are requested to ascertain scientific facts or data. As rightly pointed 
out by Arbitrator Goldsmid, “[g]eneral principles [of law] . . . are 
 
 12. GRANDO, supra note 8, at 5. 
 13. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1287 (11th ed. 2008). 
 14. See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 15 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]. 
The Court does not consider that, in giving an advisory opinion in the present case, it 
would necessarily have to write “scenarios”, to study various types of nuclear weapons 
and to evaluate highly complex and controversial technological, strategic and scientific 
information. The Court will simply address the issues arising in all their aspects by 
applying the legal rules relevant to the situation. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 15. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 259, ¶ 23 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter 
Australia Nuclear Tests Case]. 
 16. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1988 I.C.J. 89, 
¶ 52 (Dec. 20). 
 17. Abyei Arbitration (Sudan/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army), ¶ 482 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2009), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306 [hereinafter Abyei 
Arbitration Final Award]. 
 18. N. Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), Judgment, 1963 I.C.J. 29 (Dec. 2) (preliminary 
objections) [hereinafter N. Cameroons Case]. 
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always important, but they cannot produce facts.”19 This is particularly 
true when it comes to scientific facts.  
Scientific facts do not obey nor are they governed by general 
considerations of law. They are first and foremost substantially 
dependent on “scientific evidence,”20 that is, “information furnishing a 
level of proof based on the established and accepted methods of 
science.”21 They are governed by “scientific principles,” namely 
“accepted fundamental laws and facts of nature known through the 
methods of science.”22  In a nutshell, scientific fact-finding is rooted in 
methods of science and not (at least not prima facie) in methods of 
law.23 In general, international courts and tribunals are embedded with 
methods of law. Such embedment implies that “methods of science” or 
“scientific fact-finding” have necessarily to be balanced against and 
rationalized with “legal purposes.”24 In other words, the function of the 
“international adjudicator”25 is to make use of scientific methods and 
thus to “find” scientific facts “only so far as required for the application 
of international law.”26 
The process of scientific fact-finding before international courts 
and tribunals is (or perhaps should be) characterized by that dialectic 
between “methods of science” and “methods of law.”27 However, 
methods of science and methods of law do not always serve as 
blueprints for each other. Scientific fact-finding can be conducted 
within and without law since methods of science and methods of law are 
not interchangeable or mutually supportive in every case. The tribunal 
in the Abyei Arbitration emphasized this very point when it stated that 
 
 19. Helmand River Case (Afg. v. Persia), Award of Goldsmid, Arb. (1872), in 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTS, Volume 1, Early Decisions 8 (Cairo A. R. 
Robb ed. 1999). 
 20.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 639 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “scientific evidence” 
as “fact or opinion evidence that purports to draw on specialized knowledge of a science or to rely 
on scientific principles for its evidentiary value”). 
 21. See WHO, International Health Regulations art. 1.1 (2d ed. 2005) (emphasis added), 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf. 
 22. Id. (emphasis added). 
 23. See CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1287 (defining 
“science” as “the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the 
structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment”). 
 24. Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment,  1982 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 61 
(Feb. 24). 
 25. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Sarah Heathcote, The Role of the New International 
Adjudicator, 95 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 129, 129 (2001). 
 26. Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. ¶ 61. 
 27. See generally J. D’Aspremont, “The International Judge and Science,” ILA Brazil 
Conference, Joao Pessoa, Brazil, October 2010 (on file with the author) (discussing how the 
international legal system interacts with the scientific world in processing scientific evidence). 
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“the original decision-making body (the ABC Experts) and the 
reviewing body (this Tribunal) are each programmed to assess the facts 
using quite different methodologies (i.e. the methodology of science 
vis-à-vis the methodology of law).”28  
And yet, despite the existence of “inherent limitations,”29 
international adjudicators cannot “decline to take cognizance of one 
aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute”30 has scientific aspects 
and issues. To do otherwise would almost be tantamount to a non-liquet 
in the worst scenario, or at least “a factual non-liquet.”31 Nowadays, it 
“is one of the attributes of [the] judicial function”32 to deal with highly 
“complex scientific or technical disputes.”33 And, that is an 
“understandable fact of life”34 since “[t]here is no question that modern 
international relations, and hence modern diplomacy and modern 
international litigation, is daily becoming increasingly concerned with 
scientific and technological facts.”35 
 
 28. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 406. 
 29. See, e.g., Lauterpacht, supra note 5, at 18 (“Of course, cases can arise that make great 
intellectual demands upon the judges in the sense, for example, that they may require the 
assimilation of a mass of detailed evidence . . . “). 
 30. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 36 (May 24). 
 31. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 479. 
 32. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, ¶ 30 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests 
(N.Z. v. Fr.), Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) Case, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
¶ 56 (Sept. 22); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432, ¶ 30 (Dec. 4) 
(jurisdiction of the court). 
 33. On this expression, see Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, 112, 
¶ 8 (Apr. 20) (joint dissenting opinion of judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma) [hereinafter Pulp 
Mills Case Joint Dissent]. 
 34.  Rosalyn Higgins, International Courts and Tribunals—The Challenges Ahead:  
Conference Opening Speech, 7 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CT. & TRIBUNALS 262, 262 (2008). 
 35. SHABTAI ROSENNE, Fact-Finding Before the International Court of Justice, in ESSAYS 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 235, 237 (2007). See also Cesare Romano who goes as 
far as considering that  
[t]he debate about the proper role of science and scientists in courtrooms is nearly three 
centuries old. It began during the 18th century, when the scientific revolution of the 
age of Enlightenment swept away metaphysics and relegated the scientist-philosopher 
to the cabinet of curiosities. Since then, courts have struggled to develop criteria to 
evaluate the credibility of experts and the facts they present with varying results. 
Cesare Romano, The Role of Experts in International Adjudication, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
FACE AUX DÉFIS ENVIRONNEMENTAUX 181, 181 (Société française pour le droit international ed., 
2009). 
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Perhaps this has always been the case.36 Indeed, in international 
adjudication, facts are facts. The vast majority of the statutes and rules 
governing international courts and tribunals do not distinguish between 
categories of facts.37 International courts and tribunals are supposed to 
make an “objective assessment of the facts”38 or give “careful 
consideration to all the evidence placed before [them] by the Parties, to 
determine which facts must be considered relevant, to assess their 
probative value, and to draw conclusions from them as appropriate.”39 
Thus, it seems that there is no dissimilarity between “simple” facts and 
“complex” facts. All fact-finding processes are by definition intricate 
and complex processes, regardless of the nature of the facts to be 
ascertained in a particular case. Non-scientific facts can also beget 
“fact-intensive cases”40 and prove to be difficult for international 
adjudicators to ascertain.41 
Scientific facts, particularly those relating to environmental and/or 
health risks, pose unique problems in international adjudication due to 
their specific nature; they are uncertain facts. If a differentiation 
between “simple” and “complex” facts is purely abstract, a dichotomy 
between facts characterized by “certainty” and facts singularized by 
“uncertainty” reflects the process of scientific fact-finding in 
 
 36. See, e.g., Helmand River Cases (Afg./Persia), Award of Arbitrator McMahon, in 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTS, VOLUME 1, EARLY DECISIONS 12–13 (1999). In 
“Clause V” of his Award, the Arbitrator states: 
To enable both sides to satisfy themselves that this award is being complied with, and 
at the same time to avoid the necessity of fresh references to the British Government 
and the expense of special Missions, a British officer of irrigation experience shall be 
permanently attached to the British Consulate in Seistan. He will be empowered to give 
an opinion, when required by either party, on any case of doubt or dispute over water 
questions that may arise. He will, when necessary, take steps to bring the real facts of 
any case to the notice of the Government concerned. He will be able to call the 
attention of either party to any important indications of threatening danger to their 
water-supply arising from natural causes or their irrigation works. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 37. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 36, 61, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
i 1937–1946. 
 38. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 
11, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 408 (emphasis added). 
 39. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 168 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter 
Pulp Mills Case Judgment]. 
 40. Pulp Mills Case Joint Dissent, supra note 33, ¶ 8. 
 41. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 61 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities Case]; see also Stephen M. 
Schwebel, Three Cases of Fact-Finding by the International Court of Justice, in FACT-FINDING 
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 1, 1–17 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992) (defining the fact-
finding process). 
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international adjudication more acutely.42 Such a dichotomy also takes 
into account the peculiarity of scientific facts. Indeed, scientific facts 
are often a source of scientific uncertainty or the result of scientific 
uncertainty. Scientific fact-finding is irresolutely orientated towards the 
unknown—i.e., the “not known yet:” the uncertain.43 
Consequently, scientific fact-finding may be understood as a 
method to uncover the “non-fact” (the uncertain fact), whereas 
traditional fact-finding processes before international courts and 
tribunals are orientated toward the “freezing”44 of “facts.” Scientific 
fact-finding enunciates “probabilities” while traditional fact-finding 
methods validate “veracities.” Herein lies the underlying reason for the 
difficulties encountered by international courts and tribunals in dealing 
with and fully appreciating scientific facts. When dealing with scientific 
fact-finding, international courts and tribunals have the feeling that they 
are embarking on a journey with no end. Of particular note is a 
distinction drawn by the tribunal in the Abyei Arbitration between the 
task of “merely ascertain[ing] the facts” and the task of “scientifically 
research[ing], select[ing] and weigh[ing] such facts” with respect to the 
“complex constellation of historical, anthropological and geographic 
facts (many of which remain obscure to this day)” that confronted the 
tribunal in that case.45 
The present contribution aims at depicting the limits that scientific 
fact-finding per se may face within the system of international courts 
and tribunals.46 First, it demonstrates that scientific fact-finding is often 
dependent on a Cornelian “judicial” choice between ascertaining or not 
ascertaining scientific facts (Part I). The contribution then highlights the 
 
 42. See, e.g., Seabed Disputes Chamber of the Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ¶ 131, 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf 
[hereinafter Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion] (emphasizing the Tribunal’s need to 
take into account “scientific evidence concerning the scope and potential negative impact of the 
activity in question [which] is insufficient . . . where there are plausible indications of potential 
risks”) (emphasis added). 
 43. Cf. Foster, supra note 8, at 5–6 (“In disputes involving scientific uncertainty and 
potential future harm, international courts and tribunals are called upon to make judicial decisions 
in circumstances where potentially decisive facts about future events clearly cannot be obtained at 
the time of adjudication . . . . Here the concept of ‘certainty’ is to be taken literally:  an absence of 
certainty has to be accepted from the start.”). 
 44. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 30 (Dec. 22). 
 45. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 477. 
 46. See YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 104–15 (2004) (explaining the existence of a “system of international courts and 
tribunals”). 
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hurdles confronting international courts and tribunals when they act 
either as “triers” (Part II) or as “weighers” (Part III) of scientific facts. 
II.  TO ASCERTAIN OR NOT TO ASCERTAIN? THE EXODUS OF SCIENTIFIC 
FACTS IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
International adjudication is a cradle of Cartesian thinking. The 
second maxim of Descartes seems to underscore international case law 
dealing with “factual underpinnings”47—”My second maxim was to be 
as firm and resolute in my actions as I was able, and not to adhere less 
steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions, when once adopted, than if 
they had been highly certain[.]”48 “[A]dher[ing] less steadfastly to the 
most doubtful opinions,” international courts and tribunals appear ready 
to “establish which relevant facts [they] regard as having been 
convincingly established by the evidence,”49 to find “from any quarter”50 
a fact not “suggesting the slightest doubt,”51 to identify “evidence that 
can safely be relied on in a court of law,”52 to look for “clear and 
compelling evidence,”53 to “attain the . . . degree of certainty . . . that the 
facts . . . are supported by convincing evidence,”54 to acknowledge the 
absence of “doubt,”55 to “satisfy [themselves] that [they are] in 
possession of all the available facts,”56 and to determine “established 
facts.”57  
Not only is it the case that international courts and tribunals pay no 
heed to “the most doubtful”58 factual elements. Loyal to the Cartesian 
mantra, they also subscribe to the corollary rule of the second maxim 
according to which  
 
 47. Polis Fondi Immobliare di Banche Popolare S.G.R.p.A. v. Int’l Fund for Agric. Dev., 
Case No. 2010-8, ¶ 65 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1510 
[hereinafter Polis Fondi Arbitration]. 
 48. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE 
REASON, AND SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES 25 (John Veitch trans., Cosimo Books 1st ed. 
2008) (1924) (emphasis added).  
 49. Armed Activies Cases, supra note 41, ¶ 72. 
 50. Germany Fisheries Jurisdiction of the Court, supra note 6, ¶ 24. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Armed Activities Case, supra note 41, ¶ 130. 
 53. Saluka Investments B.V. (Neth. v. Czech Rep.), Partial Award, ¶ 273 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2006), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=105. 
 54. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 29 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. 
 55. Romak S.A. (Switz. v. Uzb.), Case No. AA280, Certified Award, ¶ 236 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2009), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1348. 
 56. Australia Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 15, ¶ 31. 
 57. Polis Fondi Arbitration, supra note 47, ¶ 156. 
 58. DESCARTES, supra note 48, at 25. 
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it is very certain that, when it is not in our power to determine what 
is true, we ought to act according to what is most probable; and even 
although we should not remark a greater probability in one opinion 
than in another, we ought notwithstanding to choose one or the other, 
and afterwards consider it, in so far as it relates to practice, as no 
longer dubious, but manifestly true and certain, since the reason by 
which our choice has been determined is itself possessed of these 
qualities.59  
As a consequence, international adjudicators are inclined to “make 
factual findings,”60 to “evaluate the relevance and probative force of 
each piece”61 of evidence, to isolate “insufficient evidence”62 or 
unconvincing evidence63 that has been adduced to prove facts, to ignore 
factual evidence that is not characterized by “precise observation”64 or 
which is “uncertain,”65 to categorize undisputed facts,66 to refrain from 
taking into account facts “based on the paucity of evidence,”67 to disdain 
“fragmentary and inconclusive”68 factual information, and to refuse “to 
weigh intangible and elusive points of proof.”69  
The above-described practice of international courts and tribunals 
rests upon the assumption that before an international adjudicator “can 
give a worthwhile legal opinion, he or she must know the facts.”70 Da 
mihi factum, dabo tibi jus (give me the facts and I shall give you the 
law).71 In other words, international courts and tribunals will apply the 
relevant rules of international law to “those facts which they have found 
to have existed.”72 How then should courts and tribunals react in 
 
 59. Id. (emphasis added). 
 60. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 133, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Meat Products Appellate Body 
Report]. 
 61. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain 
Dairy Products, ¶ 137, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999). 
 62. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary (Guy. v. Surin.), ¶ 424 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007), 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=664. 
 63. Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Barb. v. Trin. & 
Tobago), 27 R.I.A.A. 147, 186 ¶ 131 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910) [hereinafter Continental Shelf Case]. 
 64. Delimitation of the Border (Eri./Eth.), 25 R.I.A.A. 83, 114 ¶ 3.21 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2002). 
 65. Id. at 115, ¶ 3.25. 
 66. Polis Fondi Arbitration, supra note 47, ¶ 182 
 67. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 479. 
 68. Continental Shelf Case, supra note 63, ¶ 266. 
 69. Maritime Delimitation (Eri./Yemen), 22 R.I.A.A. 335, 352 ¶ 71 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999). 
 70. ROSENNE, supra note 35, at 235. 
 71. Daryl A. Mundis & Fergal Gaynor, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc Criminal 
Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 879, 897 n.135 (2004). 
 72. Pulp Mills Case Judgment, supra note 39, ¶ 168. 
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situations in which the facts in question are so uncertain that they have 
not been “found to exist?”73  
Scientific facts, in contrast to non-scientific facts, are precisely 
typified by their volatility, their circularity, their paucity, their 
impalpability74 as well as their “conjectures and refutations.”75 They are 
marked by disagreements “not only on the interpretation of the facts, 
but even on the existence or nature of at least some of them.”76 In short, 
international adjudicators may be confronted by difficulties in 
establishing the very “existence” of scientific facts. Does this mean that 
international courts and tribunals should decline to deal with scientific 
aspects of international disputes? Clearly not. As already explained, 
statutes and rules governing international courts and tribunals do not 
purport to segregate or exclude scientific facts from the process of fact-
finding. Moreover, the practice of international courts and tribunals 
demonstrates that a “culture of scientific fact-finding” is entrenched in 
international adjudication.   
What is required of the international adjudicator is that she or he 
strive to better integrate the rationale of scientific facts, i.e., the 
rationale of uncertainty in the process of legal fact-finding. The 
“scientific status” of a scientific fact is its “falsifiability, or refutability, 
or testability.”77 As Gaston Bachelard theorized:  “toute connaissance se 
construit contre ce que l’on sait déjà”(we know against previous 
knowledge).78 The truth can have two faces when it comes to scientific 
facts.79 
The legal conception of “fact” does not admit a “dearth of direct 
evidence”80 as a factual element to be taken into account by 
international adjudicatory bodies. By contrast, the scientific perception 
of the “fact” may confer “an ex nunc, constitutive effect”81 to scientific 
uncertainty. This is due to the fact that being in the absence of factual 
 
 73. MAKANE MBENGUE, ESSAI SUR UNE THÉORIE DU RISQUE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC:  L’ANTICIPATION DU RISQUE ENVIRONNEMENTAL ET SANITAIRE 98–100 (2009). 
 74. On the nature and content of scientific facts, see id. at 97–116. 
 75. KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS 33 (1963). 
 76. Nicaragua Case, supra note 54, ¶ 57. 
 77. POPPER, supra note 75, at 37.  
 78. See generally GASTON BACHELARD, LA FORMATION DE L’ÉSPRIT SCIENTIFIQUE:  
CONTRIBUTION À UNE PSYCHANALYSE DE LA CONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE (1938).  
 79. Contra Abyei Arbitration (Sudan/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army), ¶ 182 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009) (dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh), http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1242 [hereinafter Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh] (“[I]t 
is said that the truth cannot have two faces.”). 
 80. Continental Shelf Case, supra note 63, ¶ 247. 
 81. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 485.  
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evidence is not synonymous with evidence of absent facts when it 
comes to scientific fact-finding. For instance, in the field of climate 
change, it took almost seventeen years for the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change to determine the “very likelihood” of the impact of 
human activity on global warming (anthropogenic warming).82 During 
those seventeen years, the absence of factual evidence on the real source 
of global warming never implied that there was no evidence at all on the 
reality of global warming (i.e., the “fact” of global warming). Therefore, 
encouraging “factual non-liquet” in situations in which there is an 
“absence of sufficient evidence”83 would constitute a failure “to perform 
the act of justice requested of”84 international courts and tribunals, 
thereby hindering the good administration of justice and preventing 
international “litigation to come to an end.”85  
As long as international courts and tribunals continue to disregard 
the peculiarities of scientific fact-finding, “judicial lamentation” (Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht may perhaps have said “judicial caution” or 
“judicial hesitation”)86 will continue to surround scientific fact-finding. 
International adjudicators are indeed not at ease with “mass[es] of 
scientific and technological information,”87 or “vast amount[s] of factual 
and scientific material containing data and analysis,”88 or “complex 
scientific”89 evidence, or “highly complex and controversial 
technological, strategic and scientific information”90 or again “vast 
mass[es] of factual material.”91  
Behind the apparent quantitative problems lie concerns of a 
qualitative character with respect to the uncertain nature of scientific 
 
 82. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT:  CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, 2.4 ATTRIBUTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/mains2-4.html. 
 83. See Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 485 (as seemingly suggested by 
Professor Hafner, sitting as one of the arbitrators in the Abyei Arbitration). 
 84. Germany Fisheries Jurisdiction Judgment, supra note 6, at 209. 
 85. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
and Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 116 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter 
Genocide Convention Case]; see, e.g., ROSENNE, supra note 35, at 242 (underlining that the 
“provision of Article 59 of the Statute is likely to pose special difficulties for the Court when 
confronted” with scientific fact-finding). 
 86. LAUTERPACHT, supra  note 3, at 75 (judicial causation), 116 (judicial hesitation). 
 87. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 232, ¶ 2 (Sept. 
25) (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Skubiszewski). 
 88. Pulp Mills Case Judgment, supra note 39, ¶ 229. 
 89. Pulp Mills Case Joint Dissent, supra note 33, ¶ 11. 
 90. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 14, ¶ 15. 
 91. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 429, 
451 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) [hereinafter Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry]. 
  
64 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:53 
facts. The treatment of scientific uncertainty by the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case is illustrative of the 
factual anxiety that international courts and tribunals may develop when 
involved in scientific fact-finding.92 Scientific uncertainty was abundant 
in the evidence presented in this case, and the ICJ considered that the 
best approach was to avoid entering into a scientific fact-finding process 
tout court.93 In the words of the Court: 
Both Parties have placed on record an impressive amount of 
scientific material aimed at reinforcing their respective arguments. 
The Court has given most careful attention to this material, in which 
the Parties have developed their opposing views as to the ecological 
consequences of the Project. It concludes, however, that . . . it is not 
necessary in order to respond to the questions put to it in the Special 
Agreement for it to determine which of those points of view is 
scientifically better founded.94 
Yet, assuming that the judicial function does not require the 
international adjudicator “to give a scientific assessment . . . but to 
evaluate the claims of parties before it and whether such claims are 
sufficiently well-founded,”95 international courts and tribunals are 
without doubt mandated to ascertain scientific facts in disputes raising 
scientific aspects96 and to draw “the legal consequences that would 
follow from these facts.”97  International courts and tribunals are 
characterized by a dédoublement fonctionnel (functional duality) when 
dealing with any process of fact-finding.98 If international courts were to 
put aside their task as fact-finders because of the complexity and 
uncertainty of the scientific issues in question, they would be prevented 
from “establish[ing] particular facts that are unclear, unknown, or 
disputed.”99 And, as a consequence, they would be unable to participate 
in any sort of judgment as to the legal consequences that flow from the 
scientific facts that they decline to ascertain. This would in turn serve to 
“increase doubts in the international legal community” as to whether 
 
 92. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
 93. See id. ¶ 54. 
 94. Id. (emphasis added). 
 95. Pulp Mills Case Joint Dissent, supra note 33, ¶ 4. 
 96. See, e.g., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, supra note 79, ¶ 232 (“There has 
to be some factual evidence to evaluate.”). 
 97. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 476. 
 98.  See generally Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” 
(dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 210 (1990) (describing the 
theory of “role splitting” with regards to adjudication, and the role of adjudicators, who act “on 
behalf of the whole community”). 
 99. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 476. 
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international courts and tribunals are “well-placed to tackle complex 
scientific questions.”100  
In a visionary article, Wilfred Jenks concluded that  
[t]he impact of advanced science and technology is the most incisive 
of the decisive forces which are reshaping contemporary society on a 
scale and at a rate unprecedented in human experience. It has a 
threefold bearing on the law of nations. It has a profound, if subtle, 
influence on the fundamentals of legal thought; it poses a wide range 
of specific problems for the law; and it raises acutely the general 
question of the relationship of law, science and technology in the life 
of the world community.101  
International courts and tribunals are integrated components of the 
world community and as such they are also deeply concerned about 
reflecting upon the relationship between law and science.  
How then is it possible to build a bridge between traditional 
adjudicatory fact-finding processes and scientific fact-finding? The 
solution could well be found in reconciling the legal concept of “fact” 
with the (pure) scientific concept of “fact.” Common sense and judicial 
notice may be helpful for fact-finders, but facts are not always 
susceptible of being domesticated through the lens of legal syllogisms 
or the “spirit of legal realism.”102 They do not necessarily “[lead] 
logically to a single conclusion.”103 
In order to ensure this harmonization between different 
disciplinary understandings of “fact,” international courts and tribunals 
should free themselves of any ready-made yardsticks against which 
scientific facts are to be scrutinized. Fact-finding in international 
adjudication should thus be brought into “juxtaposition” with the “raw 
realities”104 of scientific facts. Traditional fact-finding processes need to 
better reflect scientific rules and principles governing scientific 
evidence. Scientific rules and principles, such as those formulated by 
Karl Popper, are more than “nice calculations”105 of scientific theory:   
(1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly 
every theory—if we look for confirmations. 
 
 100. See, e.g.,  Pulp Mills Case Joint Dissent, supra note 33, ¶ 3. 
 101. C. Wilfred Jenks, The New Science and the Law of Nations, 17 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.           
327, 327 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 102. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 120, ¶ 60 (Sept. 
25) (separate opinion of Judge Bedjauoi) [hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Judgment, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Bedjauoi]. 
 103. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 18, 18 (Apr. 9). 
 104. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, supra note 91, ¶ 6. 
 105. Maritime Delimitation, supra note 69, ¶ 71. 
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(2) Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky 
predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, 
we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the 
theory—an event which would have refuted the theory. 
(3) Every “good” scientific theory is a prohibition:  it forbids certain 
things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is. 
(4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-
scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often 
think) but a vice. 
. . .  
(7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still 
upheld by their admirers—for example by introducing ad hoc some 
auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a 
way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, 
but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of 
destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status.106 
Greater integration of scientific uncertainty when ascertaining 
facts, particularly facts relating to environmental and health issues, is 
necessary and ineluctable. International courts and tribunals, like other 
actors in the international legal order, are bound by the “duty to prevent, 
or at least mitigate” harm to the environment, a duty which has “become 
a principle of general international law.”107 Such a duty is met if 
scientific fact-finding is conducted for “anticipatory” purposes, where 
facts are ascertained in light of their dual nature—certain and 
uncertain—and in adherence to the philosophy of risk. Fact-finding by 
international courts and tribunals should also be subject to “new norms 
and standards”108 appertaining to scientific fact-finding.109 This would 
 
 106. POPPER, supra note 75, at 36–37. 
 107. Iron Rhine Railway (Belg./Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, 66–67, ¶ 59 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005). 
 108. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Bedjauoi, supra note 102, 
¶ 140. 
 109. See Judge Weeramantry dissenting opinion in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Request for an 
Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) Case, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 339–40 (Sept. 22) 
[hereinafter Request for Examination in Nuclear Tests, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry] where he expands on the issue: 
It is a truism that scientific knowledge increases exponentially. The knowledge of 1995 
is not the knowledge of 1974. Nor was the knowledge of 1974 the knowledge of the 
1950s. There is perhaps as much of a differential between the knowledge relating to 
such matters between the 1970s and the 1950s as there is between the knowledge of the 
1990s and the 1970s. 
   The Court is seised of the present Request at this point of time and must bring to bear 
upon it the scientific knowledge now available. A court, faced with a science-oriented 
problem of present and future damage in 1995, cannot resolve it by ignoring the 
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allow faire entrer le doute dans le droit (integration of uncertainty in 
law).110 Only then would the exodus of scientific facts be “without 
return.” Indeed, international adjudication would constitute a new 
promised land for scientific fact-finding. 
III.  THE PROMISED LAND? INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORS AS “TRIERS” 
OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 
Are international courts and tribunals the “preferred arbiters of 
fact”111 or, to use the words of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Appellate Body, the adequate “triers”112 of scientific facts? As triers of 
facts, international courts and tribunals have “[t]he duty to make an 
objective assessment of the facts[,] . . . [i.e.,] an obligation to consider 
the evidence presented . . . and to make factual findings on the basis of 
that evidence.”113 In other words, for a court or tribunal to be a trier of 
facts implies a duty to examine (all) scientific evidence submitted to it 
in a given case and to ascertain the facts. 
One can easily imagine the uneasiness of international adjudicators 
when being asked to deal with ascertaining “scientific evidentiary 
material”114 relating to bad odors, persistent organic pollutants, 
genetically modified organisms, effluent discharges, absorbable organic 
halogens, phosphorus, algal bloom, phenolic substances, nonylphenols, 
dioxins and furans, air pollution, risk of eutrophication, hormones, 
fisheries data, manganese-base fuel additives, and so on. States, at 
 
knowledge acquired between 1974 and 1995, and by applying to the problem in hand 
the knowledge of 1974. That would be an exercise in unreality. 
Id. 
   Professor Philippe Sands took the same position in the MOX Plant case with respect of the 
implications of new scientific knowledge on the law: 
The United Kingdom says that the discharges are minimal and no harm is caused. That 
may have been right in 1982 when the Law of the Sea Convention was adopted, but 
our understanding of the impacts of radiation on the environment and on human health 
have changed and new technologies have emerged to reduce or eliminate entirely 
releases into the marine environment. The law evolves to take into account these 
changes. What may have been internationally lawful in 1982 may not be lawful in 
1993. What may have been lawful in 1993 may not be lawful in 2001. 
MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Verbatim Record, 29 http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/ 
documents/cases/case_no_10/vre1911.06.pdf.  
 110. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Faire entrer le doute dans le droit, 3 BIOTECH 
FORUM 10–11 (2001). 
 111. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 415. 
 112. Meat Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 60, ¶ 132. See also Appellate Body 
Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 161, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R (Jan. 
18, 1999) [hereinafter Korea Alcoholic Beverages Report]. 
 113. Meat Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 60, ¶ 133. 
 114. Id. ¶ 110. 
  
68 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:53 
times, are even more reluctant to consider that international courts and 
tribunals can analyze scientific facts. The arguments of Japan in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna case with respect to its admissibility are 
illustrative of such reluctance—even a certain animosity—towards 
scientific fact-finding within international adjudication. Japan went as 
far as asserting that “questions of scientific judgment . . . are not 
justiciable” and concluding that “all turn on matters of scientific, not 
legal, judgment.”115 Such a hermetic approach to the relationship 
between science and law is far from the “contemporary concerns of the 
community of nations.”116 The ICJ itself has acknowledged the 
“normative” value of science when it declared:  “[O]wing to new 
scientific insights . . . new norms and standards have been 
developed.”117 
International adjudication “would be devoid of meaning if disputes 
concerning questions of scientific fact and opinion were not 
justiciable.”118 International courts and tribunals are legitimately 
expected to act as triers of scientific facts,119 and they cannot decline to 
undertake such a task by asserting that “disputes are scientific rather 
than legal.”120 Otherwise, they could appear as acting infra petita. 
Practice before international adjudicatory bodies reveals that these fora 
could serve as institutional fertilizers for scientific facts. This is mainly 
due to the fact that “international tribunals are generally free to admit 
and evaluate evidence of every kind.”121 Thus, there is no fear a priori of 
 
 115. Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), 23 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶ 40(a) (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 2000) [hereinafter Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration]. 
 116. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 129 WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimps Products Report]. 
 117. Gabcikovo-Nagyamaros Judgment, supra note 92, ¶ 140. 
 118. Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, supra note 115, ¶ 41(c). 
 119. European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
Report of the Appellate Body, 19 January 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, ¶ 133. See 
also Meat Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 60, ¶ 132. 
 120. Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, supra note 115, ¶ 35. 
 121. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, ¶ 6.34, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000) [hereinafter European 
Communities Appellate Body Report]; see also MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND 
RELATED ISSUES:  A STUDY OF EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 180, 184 (1996) 
(emphasis added). 
The inherent flexibility of the international procedure, and its tendency to be free from 
technical rules of evidence applied in municipal law, provide the “evidence” with a 
wider scope in international proceedings . . . . Generally speaking, international 
tribunals have not committed themselves to the restrictive rules of evidence of 
municipal law. They have found it justified to receive every kind and form of evidence, 
and have attached to them the probative value they deserve under the circumstances of 
a given case. 
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dealing with scientific information contained, for instance, in “satellite 
photographs,”122 “environmental impact assessment[s],”123 
“contemporary satellite evidence,”124 or “hazardous waste evaluations 
and assessments.”125 
At the same time, practice also evinces a tendency for international 
courts and tribunals to reduce scientific facts to simple 
“euphemisms,”126 and to “embark upon the vain task of equalizing the 
facts of nature,”127 or to “refashion . . . nature.”128 These ambivalent 
dynamics have implications on the treatment of scientific facts by 
international adjudicators. 
Indeed, in their capacity as triers of facts in general, and of 
scientific facts more particularly, international courts and tribunals are 
caught between the dilemma of ascertaining facts through “legal 
characterization”129 or through a “science-oriented”130 methodology. The 
tribunal in the Abyei Arbitration even tentatively formulated a sporadic 
distinction between “pure fact-finding,” in reference to fact-finding 
dealing only with scientific and technical facts, and “full 
adjudication.”131 Yet, scientific fact-finding should not in principle lead 
to any fragmented methodology in the ascertainment of facts, if as 
underlined “a scientific question can be answered only through rigorous 
scientific research” and “there should not be one standard for scientists 
and another for the courtroom.”132 Such a desire to “combin[e] the 
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 122. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area, Request for Indication of 
Provisional Measures (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), ¶ 46 (Mar. 8, 2011) (order). 
 123. See, e.g., World Bank Inspection Panel, Request for Inspection:  Argentina/Paraguay:  
Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project Panel Review and Assessment ¶ 2.8 (Sept. 16, 1997), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/PanelReviewandAssess
ment.pdf; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 
Award, ¶ 150 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 158 (2004).  
 124. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 368. 
 125. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 86 (Aug. 30, 
2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 209 (2002). 
 126. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry, supra note 91, at 451. 
 127. Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment,  1982 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 13 
(Feb. 24) (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros). 
    128.    Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18, 299 ¶ 17 
(Feb. 24) (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Evensen); see also Continental Shelf 
(Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18, 257 ¶ 91 (Feb. 24) (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Oda). 
 129. Meat Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 60, ¶ 117. 
 130. Request for Examination in Nuclear Tests, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 
supra note 109, 340. 
    131. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 462. 
 132. ROSENNE, supra note 35, at 245. 
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rigour of the scientific community with the requirements of the 
courtroom” remains to be fully realized. 133 
What is evident is the relief that international courts and tribunals 
show when there is “a preference for a scientific methodology”134 and 
that the task of “customary . . . fact-finders,”135 as well as applying the 
said scientific methodology, is accordingly entrusted to non-
adjudicatory bodies. In the eyes of the concerned courts and tribunals, 
those “scientific fact-finders” are more appraised to “disclose the fruits 
of their research in some manner appropriate to their respective fields 
of scientific research.”136 What is the legal effect of such a relief on the 
power (requirement, in certain cases) of international courts and 
tribunals to act as triers of scientific facts? Does scientific fact-finding 
by non-adjudicatory bodies (“based on scientific analysis and 
research”137) only acquire a status of “extra-judicial evidence?”138 Or 
should international adjudicators subject scientific facts to a 
“Darwinian” process of “legal selection?” 
The arbitral tribunal in the Abyei Arbitration, for example, opted 
for a passive treatment of scientific fact-finding taking into account the 
interpretation of its mandate as excluding “an analysis of the substantive 
correctness” of scientific facts.139 The tribunal put it clearly that it would 
not “engage at the outset in an omnibus re-opening of the . . . [scientific] 
appreciation of evidence[.]”140 Noteworthy are, however, the 
consequences that the tribunal deduced from its passive approach. 
While international courts and tribunals are generally reluctant vis-à-vis 
the value of scientific evidence, the Abyei Arbitration considered 
scientific fact-finding based on “scarce factual evidence,”141 facts 
ascertained “regardless of the strength or weakness of the evidence . . . 
uncovered,”142 or “marked, in varying degrees, by some imprecision”143 
and by “subjective assessment”144 to be highly probative. The reluctance 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 521. 
 135. Id. ¶ 478. 
 136. Id. ¶ 521 (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Azinian, Davitian & Baca v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, ¶ 55 
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 139. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 410. 
 140. Id. ¶ 411. 
 141. Id. ¶ 455. 
 142. Id. ¶ 482. 
 143. Id. ¶ 534. 
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of the tribunal in entering into a process of scientific-finding reached its 
peak with the tribunal stating evasively and without further reasoning 
that it “does not believe that any new evidence that has come to light is 
outcome-determinative.”145 
The approach of the arbitral tribunal in the Methanex case starkly 
contrasts with the Abyei Arbitration. There, the tribunal opted for an 
active approach in its treatment of scientific facts (i.e., it decided “to 
summarise the principal findings of fact which [it] has made in regard to 
the scientific issues relating to MTBE” (methyl tertiary-butyl ether)).146 
It is true that one of the parties to the case expressly requested the 
arbitral tribunal to deal with the question of “whether the scientific 
conclusions which were presented to the Governor were so faulty that 
the tribunal may reasonably infer that the science merely provided a 
convenient excuse for the hidden regulation of methanol producers.”147 
The tribunal acted as a true trier of the scientific facts by ascertaining 
the facts and evidence before it. In its “scientific fact-finding” part, the 
award reads as follows: 
(1) The California ban on the oxygenate MTBE began as a policy 
decision of the California Senate which, as expressed in the 
California Bill, was contingent on the scientific findings of the UC 
[University of California at Davis] Report and which was to be 
implemented by California in the light of its public hearings, 
testimony and peer review;  
(2) This policy was motivated by the honest belief, held in good faith 
and on reasonable scientific grounds, that MTBE contaminated 
groundwater and was difficult and expensive to clean up;  
(3) There is no credible evidence that, by commissioning or 
producing the UC Report, the California Senate or the University of 
California researchers intended to favour the United States ethanol 
industry or particular companies within it (including ADM); and  
(4) There is no credible evidence of any intention on the part of the 
California Senate or the University of California researchers, by 
commissioning or producing the UC Report, to injure methanol 
producers, whether US or foreign companies (including 
Methanex).148 
 
 145. Abyei Arbitration Final Award, supra note 17, ¶ 538. 
 146. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and 
Merits, ¶ 102 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/ 
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Other international courts and tribunals adopt an intermediary 
approach consisting of giving prevalence to “sound scientific 
findings,”149 not to say “scientific certainty” (“evidential certainty”)150 in 
the ascertainment of scientific facts without properly (or systematically) 
presenting an “outline”151 of the identified facts. The said international 
courts and tribunals are governed by what may be called the Trail 
Smelter “pattern.”152 This is an approach taken by the ICJ, which 
accords significant weight to “bulky scientific evidence.”153 One can 
then understand more easily the disarray in which the ICJ finds itself 
when it is not provided with conclusive scientific evidence or “matters 
of popular knowledge.”154 The number of formulations that the Court 
employed in the Pulp Mills case expresses the scientific vacuum in 
which the Court felt it was left. As Judge ad hoc Vinuesa, dissenting in 
the case, points out: 
In various key passages, the Court reaches conclusions on alleged 
substantial violations while acknowledging the lack of scientific 
certainty underpinning those findings:  “Argentina has not 
convincingly demonstrated that Uruguay”; “the Court is not in a 
position to conclude that Uruguay”; it has “not been established to 
the satisfaction of the Court”; “there is insufficient evidence”;  “there 
is no clear evidence to link”; “a clear relationship has not been 
established”; “the record does not show any clear evidence.”155 
It is clear, however, that regardless of the approach adopted, 
international courts and tribunals are guided by the same primary 
leitmotiv:  the constant need to “know” what constitutes the “scientific 
factual matrix” of international disputes. Where they might differ is 
 
 149. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, 266–67, ¶ 40 (Apr. 20) 
(dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Vinuesa) [hereinafter Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc 
Vinuesa]. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry, supra note 91, ¶ 451. 
 152. Trail Smelter Case (U.S./Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1970 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941). 
The Tribunal, therefore, finds . . . that, under the principles of international law, as well 
as of the law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or 
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 
Id. at 1965 (emphasis added). 
 153. Methanex Final Award, supra note 146, ¶ 13. 
 154. Request for Examination in Nuclear Tests, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 
supra note 109, ¶ 340. 
 155. Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Vinuesa, supra note 149, at 284, ¶ 70 (citations 
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with respect to the precautionary treatment of scientific facts. This may 
lead to “anachronistic results.”156 For example, although scientific 
certainty is fundamental in the multilateral trading system,157 the WTO 
Appellate Body has acknowledged that “‘theoretical uncertainty’ . . . is 
inherent in the scientific method and . . . stems from the intrinsic limits 
of experiments, methodologies, or instruments deployed by scientists to 
explain a given phenomenon.”158 The complexity and uncertainty of 
scientific fact-finding needs to be addressed adequately and promptly by 
international courts and tribunals. A long march awaits until then. 
IV.  THE LONG MARCH? INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORS AS “WEIGHERS” 
OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 
It is generally “within the discretion” of international courts and 
tribunals “to decide which evidence [they] choose to utilize in making 
[factual] findings.”159 “Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to 
choose.”160 As “weighers” of scientific facts, it is expected that 
international courts and tribunals proceed to determine “the credibility 
and weight properly to be ascribed to (that is, the appreciation of) a 
given piece of evidence.”161 What differentiates the function of the 
international adjudicator as “trier” and its function as “weigher” is a 
psychological element:  the element of choice. International courts and 
tribunals are purely identifying the scientific evidence, the known 
(certainty) and the unknown (uncertainty) with respect to a scientific 
fact, when they act as triers of scientific facts. As such, they are 
engaged in a process of ascertaining stricto sensu. When acting as 
weighers of scientific facts, international courts and tribunals select 
among scientific facts. That is to say, they are categorizing what ought 
to be relevant scientific facts and what ought not to be. It is no longer a 
process of ascertaining stricto sensu, but a process of evaluation.  
Weighing factual evidence “is part and parcel of the fact finding 
process.”162 International courts and tribunals are thus presumed to be 
 
 156. OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 103, ¶ 103 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003). 
 157. See, e.g., Meat Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 60, ¶ 186 (“The Panel might 
arguably have used the terms ‘scientifically identified risk’ and ‘identifiable risk’ simply to refer 
to an ascertainable risk:  if a risk is not ascertainable, how does a Member ever know or 
demonstrate that it exists?”). 
 158. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, ¶ 241, 
WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan Appellate Body Report]. 
 159. Meat Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 60, ¶ 135. 
 160. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 481 (2d ed. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 161. Meat Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 60, ¶ 132. 
 162. Id. 
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able to “second-guess”163 scientific findings and are not required in 
principle to accord to factual evidence submitted by parties to a dispute 
“the same meaning and weight as do the parties.”164 Such an 
understanding of the international adjudicator in the wonderland of 
scientific “fact-weighing” seems to contrast with the “scientific spleen” 
that characterizes the role of the international adjudicator as an 
“original-trier-of-facts.”165 But this is just the tip of the iceberg.   
Indeed, strong doubts and criticisms have been raised about the 
capacity of international courts and tribunals to adequately “evaluate the 
relevance and probative force of each piece”166 of scientific evidence. In 
particular, such doubts were raised with respect to the judgment of the 
ICJ in the Pulp Mills case by Judge ad hoc Vinuesa who firmly 
questioned “the Court’s ability to make appropriate determinations of 
fact . . . based on sound scientific findings”167 and who charged the 
Court with “transforming a previous binding obligation to produce 
evidence into a mere goodwill gesture to co-operate by providing 
evidence to the Court.”168 Judge ad hoc Vinuesa went so far as to assert 
that “despite the lack of specialized expert knowledge, the Court sets 
itself the task of choosing what scientific evidence is best, discarding 
other evidence, and evaluating and weighing raw data and drawing 
conclusions.”169  
Similarly in the same case, Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma 
strongly objected to the “deficient method of scientific fact-finding”170 
used by the ICJ in weighing scientific evidence, and they lamented that 
the “Court has clung to the habits it has traditionally followed for the 
assessment and evaluation of evidence.”171 However, it is noteworthy 
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that both Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma concluded in relation to the 
role of the ICJ and other international courts and tribunals as “weighers” 
of scientific facts that 
[t]he Court on its own is not in a position adequately to assess and 
weigh complex scientific evidence of the type presented by the 
Parties . . . a court of justice cannot assess, without the assistance of 
experts, claims as to whether two or three-dimensional modelling is 
the best or even appropriate practice in evaluating the 
hydrodynamics of a river, or what role an Acoustic Doppler Current 
Profiler can play in such an evaluation.  Nor is the Court, indeed any 
court save a specialized one, well-placed, without expert assistance, 
to consider the effects of the breakdown of nonylphenolethoxylates, 
the binding of sediments to phosphorus, the possible chain of 
causation which can lead to an algal bloom, or the implications of 
various substances for the health of various organisms which exist in 
the River Uruguay.  This is surely uncontroversial:  the task of a 
court of justice is not to give a scientific assessment of what has 
happened, but to evaluate the claims of parties before it and whether 
such claims are sufficiently well-founded so as to constitute evidence 
of a breach of a legal obligation.172 
It is undisputable—not to say evident—that international courts 
and tribunals would benefit by resorting more systematically to the 
“assistance of experts” when confronted with issues of scientific fact-
finding. However, it is not within the scope of the present contribution 
to describe the rules for use of experts before various international 
courts and tribunals, nor to analyze whether specific procedures such as, 
for instance, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Optional Rules for 
Arbitration of Disputes relating to Natural Resources and the 
Environment, are more suitable to cope with scientific fact-finding than 
the traditional approach taken in international dispute settlement.173 
These aspects have been dealt with elsewhere in legal scholarship.174 At 
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the end of the day the vast majority of international courts and tribunals 
are “guardian[s]“175 of their statutes and/or rules of procedure and they 
have the “sole competence”176 to determine “mandatory requirements”177 
or “matters under [their] Statute.”178 Thus, international adjudicators are 
at liberty to make use in principle of expert advice and assistance when 
they deem it reasonable and necessary. They have done so in the past, 
they are doing so presently and they will surely do so in the future.  
What needs to be addressed leveling this contribution is the idea 
according to which the “task of a court of justice is not to give a 
scientific assessment of what has happened.”179 If “scientific 
assessment” means “a scientific process aimed at establishing the 
scientific basis”180 of facts, then there is no doubt that international 
courts and tribunals are not “scientific facts or risks assessors.” If 
“scientific assessment” implies “matters . . . susceptible of quantitative 
analysis by the empirical or experimental laboratory methods 
commonly associated with the physical sciences,”181 or ascertainment of 
facts “in a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled 
conditions,”182 one can still agree with the claim that the “exercise and 
the integrity of the . . . adjudicative function”183 does not entail 
“scientific assessment.” As a consequence, it is difficult to support 
criticisms relating to the absence, within an international court, of 
“discussion about the scientific integrity of the scientific methodologies 
applied,” and of “discussion about the scientific integrity of the results,” 
or relating to “silence on the important issue of credibility of the 
scientific submissions.”184 The international judicial function does not 
call out international courts and tribunals as going so far as 
“determin[ing] whether the data is scientifically viable or credible.”185  
Nevertheless, if “scientific assessment” is understood in its other 
ordinary meaning (i.e., as “a process characterized by systematic, 
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disciplined and objective enquiry and analysis, that is, a mode of 
studying and sorting out facts and opinions”),186 nothing prevents a 
priori an international court or tribunal as a “weigher” of facts—even 
less the ICJ—to “give a scientific assessment of what has happened.”187 
Any court of law can conduct this task of “scientific assessment”—even 
more efficiently with the assistance of experts,188 technical international 
organizations,189 experts fantômes,190 or “any relevant source”191—as 
long as it is not engaging in “quantitative analysis by the empirical or 
experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with the 
physical sciences,”192 which would be materially and functionally 
impossible for a court of law. As clearly pointed out by a WTO panel: 
We cannot conduct our own risk assessment. Nor do we attempt to 
do so. . . . Our mandate is different. We are not asked to make a 
scientific risk comparison nor to state with scientific certainty that 
one product is riskier than the other. We can only weigh the evidence 
put before us and, on the basis of the rules of burden of proof we 
adopted, including the use of factual presumptions, decide whether 
sufficient evidence is before us—evidence which has not been 
rebutted—in order to state that it can be presumed that one product is 
riskier than the other.193 
For international courts and tribunals to successfully carry out the 
task of “scientific assessment,” “the necessity or propriety of 
examination and evaluation” of scientific facts “would have to be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis,”194 free from any monolithic 
perception of fact-finding processes in international adjudication. Thus, 
ideas according to which “the parties are masters of the evidence” and 
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international adjudicators have a “passive role” do not reflect the 
challenges posed by scientific fact-finding.195  
The weighing of scientific facts—or, the scientific assessment of 
what has happened—indisputably requires international courts and 
tribunals to determine whether a scientific fact “is sufficiently supported 
or reasonably warranted” by scientific evidence.196 For courts and 
tribunals to move more spontaneously in such a direction, they would 
have to adopt an active role and to “[interweave] legal process with 
knowledge and expertise”,197 but most of all they would have to 
acknowledge the evolutionary character of their inherent fact-finding 
powers in light of scientific complexity and uncertainty.   
The Affaire du lac Lanoux shows that, among international courts 
and tribunals, weighing scientific facts “of which [they] ha[ve] been 
apprized”198 was already an accepted practice in early interstate 
arbitrations dealing with partially or wholly scientific questions.199 
However, it was the arbitral tribunal constituted in the Methanex case 
which most recently confirmed that the ability of international judicial 
organs to act as weighers of facts is not a myth nor illusory.200 In a long 
passage—which deserves to be quoted in its entirety—the arbitral 
tribunal set the tone and shortened the “long march” to scientific “fact-
weighing” in international adjudication: 
Having considered all the expert evidence adduced in these 
proceedings by both Disputing Parties, the Tribunal accepts the UC 
Report as reflecting a serious, objective and scientific approach to a 
complex problem in California. Whilst it is possible for other 
scientists and researchers to disagree in good faith with certain of its 
methodologies, analyses and conclusions, the fact of such 
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disagreement, even if correct, does not warrant this Tribunal in 
treating the UC Report as part of a political sham by California. In 
particular, the UC Report was subjected at the time to public 
hearings, testimony and peer-review; and its emergence as a serious 
scientific work from such an open and informed debate is the best 
evidence that it was not the product of a political sham engineered by 
California, leading subsequently to the two measures impugned by 
Methanex in these arbitration proceedings. Moreover, in all material 
respects, the Tribunal is not persuaded that the UC Report was 
scientifically incorrect:  the Tribunal was much impressed by the 
scientific expert witnesses presented by the USA and tested under 
cross-examination by Methanex; and the Tribunal accepts without 
reservation these experts’ conclusions.201   
If international arbitral tribunals can act as weighers of scientific 
facts, there are no objective reasons for preventing other international 
courts and tribunals—in particular the ICJ and, to a lesser extent, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea—from playing the same 
role and, in so doing, they may acknowledge the deficiency of their own 
“traditional methods of evaluating evidence.”202 One must commend the 
greater “scientific prudence,”203 “vigilance”204 and “caution”205 of 
international courts and tribunals that cope with scientific fact-finding. 
The international adjudicator is facing a “time of [scientific] 
perplexity”206 and “postmodern [factual] anxieties.”207 International 
courts and tribunals will have to address those anxieties by adopting a 
clear and predictable position vis-à-vis scientific facts. To put an end to 
the “long march” of scientific fact-finding, will international 
adjudicators have to choose between the roads of conservatism (“one 
who does not go far enough”), radicalism (“one who goes too far”), and 
reaction (“one who won’t go at all”)?208 The answer requires—yet 
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again—the weighing of facts. This time, however, the facts are not 
scientific; rather, they are judicial. 
